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Abstract
A recent innovation in televised election debates is a continuous response measure (commonly referred to as the ‘‘worm’’)
that allows viewers to track the response of a sample of undecided voters in real-time. A potential danger of presenting
such data is that it may prevent people from making independent evaluations. We report an experiment with 150
participants in which we manipulated the worm and superimposed it on a live broadcast of a UK election debate. The
majority of viewers were unaware that the worm had been manipulated, and yet we were able to influence their perception
of who won the debate, their choice of preferred prime minister, and their voting intentions. We argue that there is an
urgent need to reconsider the simultaneous broadcast of average response data with televised election debates.
Citation: Davis CJ, Bowers JS, Memon A (2011) Social Influence in Televised Election Debates: A Potential Distortion of Democracy. PLoS ONE 6(3): e18154.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018154
Editor: Colin Allen, Indiana University, United States of America
Received September 1, 2010; Accepted February 27, 2011; Published March 30, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Davis et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This research was funded by the personal research budgets of the authors.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: c.davis@rhul.ac.uk
Introduction
Televised election debates were introduced in the United States
in 1960, and now play a prominent role in the election campaigns
of many countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom. In 2009, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Iran
screened their first ever televised debates [1]. Such televised
debates can trigger substantial shifts in voting intentions, and
‘‘winning’’ a debate has a significant positive impact on electoral
support for the candidate’s party, particularly among undecided
voters, though such effects may be relatively short-lived [2–9]. In a
close electoral race, winning a debate shortly before Election Day
could determine the outcome of the election.
A feature of some recent televised election debates has been a
real-time response measure – commonly referred to as ‘‘the
worm’’ – which represents the average response of a small sample
of undecided voters who watch the debate and use a handset to
record their satisfaction with what the leaders are saying (e.g., the
viewers turn a dial to the right to indicate approval, and to the left
to indicate disapproval). These ratings are averaged over the entire
sample in real-time and the average response is plotted using a
moving line superimposed over the video of the debate (see
Figure 1). The sample size is typically around twenty to thirty
viewers; for example, CNN used a sample size of 30 voters to
generate a worm in the 2008 US Presidential debates [10]. The
worm graph allows viewers to see instantaneous reactions to the
performance of the candidates, adding drama and interest to the
debates. This technology has recently been adopted in elections in
the US, UK, New Zealand, Australia, and given recent trends, is
likely to be adopted more widely in the future. Experience in
Australia and the United States has been that, given the choice,
viewers prefer to watch election debate coverage that includes a
worm, though the presentation of the worm has been the subject of
controversy [10,11].
Our question was whether the worm exerts a social influence
effect. The psychological literature includes many demonstrations
of how individuals can be strongly influenced by the opinions of
others, especially (though not only) in situations involving
uncertainty [12–15]. Social influence effects are partly normative,
whereby observers strive to conform with their social group.
However, social influence effects are observed even when
normative factors are minimised (e.g., by making observers’
responses anonymous and reducing the observer’s identification
with the group). People are motivated to be accurate, and when
judgments or decisions are difficult, this motivation may prompt us
to take information from others as evidence about reality [14].
Such informational influence effects have been reported in
experiments in which observers make simple perceptual judgments
[12–14], as well as those in which they respond to more complex
real-world stimuli; for example, observers rate a joke as funnier
(and are themselves more likely to laugh) if the joke is followed by
laughter [16]. Social influence also affects people’s memories [17],
as illustrated by the memory conformity effect, in which
eyewitnesses influence each other’s memories for an event [18].
Two previous studies have investigated the influence of a worm-
type graphic on viewer evaluations [19,20; we thank an
anonymous reviewer for bringing these studies to our attention].
In one study [19], participants watched video clips taken from the
German version of the television program Pop Idol (American Idol in
the US). They were told that the videos had been viewed
previously by an audience of young adults, and that the responses
of these adults were measured in real-time, and would be displayed
as a graphic over the video. All participants watched the same
clips, but there were three different versions of the worm graph,
one that was positive, one that was negative, and one that
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Participants exposed to the negative version rated the performance
more negatively than participants exposed to the neutral or
positive versions; they also enjoyed the performance less.
Interestingly, the ratings of participants exposed to the positive
version did not differ from those of the participants exposed to the
neutral version. Thus, exposure to the worm did have a clear
social influence effect, but only in one direction: social influence
was able to diminish performance evaluations but not improve
them.
The extent to which social influence effects that have been
observed in laboratory tasks might affect judgments of a real-world
political debate is not clear. The participants in an election debate
are themselves actively seeking to influence viewers, providing a
rather different context from that in which social influence effects
have previously been studied. Furthermore, social influence effects
are weaker when the object of evaluation is more consequential
[21]. Thus, a viewer of an election debate may be less susceptible
to social influence effects, assuming that he or she has some stake
in the outcome of the election. Another factor that might be
expected to diminish social influence effects in this context is the
fact that political attitudes are difficult to change. This tenacity is
partly due to party-political affiliations, but also reflects the
robustness of those policy attitudes that are important to an
individual [22]. When a candidate in a political debate offers a
policy position that differs from the viewers, the discrepancy is
likely to elicit a more elaborative consideration than statements
that are consistent with the viewer’s own attitudes, and such
elaborative processes are less vulnerable to social influence effects
[23]. Thus, an apparently positive response from other viewers is
unlikely to counteract the tendency for a viewer to negatively
evaluate candidates whose statements disagree with her own
attitudes. Each of the above-mentioned factors may cause us to
doubt whether a televised worm graph has the potential to
influence viewers’ perceptions of an election debate.
There is one previous study that has tested the influence of the
worm graph on viewers of election debates [20]. Participants,
tested in groups of 15–20, watched short segments of the second
Figure 1. Examples of stimuli, and explanation of their production. (a) A screen shot from the first UK election debate (April 15, 2010),
including worm, as shown on ITV.com. (b) Components involved in manipulation of worm and superposition on debate broadcast.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018154.g001
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student was given a handheld dial and shown how to use it to
indicate their opinions during the debate. They were told that the
line graph that they saw superimposed over the debate videotape
showed the group’s average opinion. In fact, the graph had been
programmed in advance to favour either Reagan or Mondale.
Participants who saw the pro-Reagan feedback rated Reagan’s
performance as better than Mondale’s, whereas participants who
saw the pro-Mondale feedback rated Mondale’s performance as
better than Reagan’s. This finding suggests that the worm can
have a powerful social influence effect on viewers of election
debates. However, the ecological validity of this study can be
criticised on a number of grounds. First, the excerpts that
participants watched were from a debate that had occurred many
years earlier. This could be problematic for various reasons: the
issues discussed in the debate were not topical; it is likely that one
of the candidates was not well-known to the viewers; the outcome
of the election was (presumably) known to the viewers; and,
perhaps most importantly, the participants were not able to vote
for these candidates, and thus had no particular stake in the
outcome of the debate. Second, in contrast to the usual experience
of viewing debates, the participants in this study were required to
make continuous ratings of their own opinion. This aspect of the
study may have exaggerated social influence effects, especially if
participants actively compared how the movements of the worm
compared with their own movements of the dial. Furthermore, the
participants’ attention was explicitly drawn to the worm prior to
the debate, e.g., they were shown how it could reflect their own
movement of the dial, and they were given (misleading) details
about the computation of the data plotted by the worm. Finally,
participants in this study watched only excerpts of the debate,
rather than the full 90-minute debate. These issues do not
undermine the conclusions of this study (though see Ref. 10 for an
alternative view), but they do raise the question of how likely its
findings are to generalise to a more typical experience of viewing
an election debate. Our study is better placed to address this
question, as it involved participants watching an entire live election
debate (for an election in which they were eligible to vote), without
being required to make their own continuous ratings.
To test whether viewers of worm graphs are vulnerable to social
influences, we asked two groups of 75 adults (students at Royal
Holloway, University of London) to watch a live broadcast of the
third (and final) 2010 UK election debate that included a worm of
a similar format as in broadcasts of prior debates (see Figure 1).
Unbeknownst to the participants, the worms seen by the two
groups were manipulated by us to favour different candidates. In
one group, the worm systematically favoured the incumbent,
Gordon Brown, over the other two candidates. In the other group,
the worm favoured Nick Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democrat
party. The worms seen by these two groups deviated by a fixed
amount, in opposite directions, from a single baseline worm that
was controlled by the experimenter. Our worms were superim-
posed on the live broadcast using video mixers (Figure 1). Our
hypothesis was that perceptions of the debate would differ between
the two groups in accord with the worm’s bias.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Psychology Department at Royal Holloway, University of London.
All participants provided written informed consent, and were fully
debriefed at the conclusion of the experiment.
Participants
The participants were 85 female and 65 male students at Royal
Holloway, University of London; the majority (79%) were
undergraduates, were of British nationality (77%), and were aged
between 18 and 25 (95%). Participants received £20 for taking
part. They were randomly assigned to one of two groups: Group 1
viewed a worm which favoured the incumbent Prime Minister
Gordon Brown; Group 2 viewed a worm that favoured the Liberal
Democrats leader Nick Clegg.
Worm manipulation
The worm was controlled by an experimenter (CD) from his
office in the Psychology Department. This control was achieved by
means of two bespoke C++ programs. The first program (the
‘‘master’’) ran on the experimenter’s PC, and transmitted data, via
an internet connection, to PCs in the two lecture theatres where
the debate was watched. The latter PCs ran the second program
(the ‘‘client’’), which received the data and plotted a worm graph.
This graph consisted of a white time series line framed by a white
border on a black background. The minimum and maximum
value of the y-axis were given the labels ‘‘Negative’’ and
‘‘Positive’’, respectively, and there was also a horizontal axis with
zero-intercept labelled ‘‘Neutral’’ (see Figure 1). The master
program plotted the movements of three worms: the Brown-biased
worm, the Clegg-biased worm and an intermediate worm. The
experimenter pressed keys to move the intermediate worm up or
down at one of three possible gradients; in the absence of input the
worm traversed a line with a gradient of zero. The experimenter
also used the program interface to indicate which candidate was
currently speaking. This information was used by the program to
compute the movements of the biased worms. When the current
speaker corresponded to the worm’s bias, movements in the
positive direction were 25% steeper than the unbiased worm, and
movements in the negative direction were 25% less steep.
Conversely, when the current speaker corresponded to a candidate
not favoured by a worm, movements in the positive direction were
25% less steep than the unbiased worm, and movements in the
negative direction were 25% steeper. These speaker-dependent
gradients meant that the two biased worms diverged (from each
other and from the intermediate worm) fairly soon after Brown or
Cameron began speaking, and rapidly approached the maximum
distance from the intermediate worm. This maximum distance
was 0.10 at the beginning of the debate, and increased to 0.15 after
approximately 20 minutes. That is, when Brown was speaking, the
Brown-biased worm was higher than the unbiased worm and the
Clegg-biased worm was lower than the unbiased worm. When
Cameron was speaking, the worms in both groups were lower than
the unbiased worm. The first author adjusted the unbiased worm
in response to the candidates in real time so that that the
movements of the worms appeared plausible and responsive to the
ongoing debate.
Apparatus and technical details
Each lecture theatre was equipped with a desktop PC, a laptop
computer, a vision mixer (Panasonic MX50) and a DVD recorder.
The live broadcast from the BBC website provided one input to the
mixer, while the desktop PC (which output the worm graphic)
provided a separate input; the two inputs were combined using a
luminance key-in technique that overlaid the worm on the live
debatefeed.Theresultingsignalwasdisplayedonalargescreenand
also recorded in DVD format. Some example clips can be found
here: http://www.pc.rhul.ac.uk/staff/c.davis/ElectionDebate/.
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The study took place on the evening of the final of three UK
election debates (29th April, 2010). Upon arrival, participants were
directed to one of two different lecture theatres (depending on
which group they had been randomly assigned to) and asked to
complete the pre-debate questionnaire. The lead experimenter in
each room then welcomed subjects to the study and showed them
a 2.5 minute YouTube clip of the first debate to give them an idea
of what they should expect to see. Approximately 30 seconds into
the clip the experimenter mentioned the ‘‘worm’’ in passing,
pointing out how it moved up and down in response to what the
leaders said. Our aim here was to show an example of the worm
for the benefit of those viewers who had not seen its use in previous
debates, and who might otherwise have good reason to suspect
that this feature of the broadcast was engineered by us. At this
point, the experimenter simply remarked that one of the questions
after the debate would be about the worm. Next the experimenter
reminded participants the experiment was about memory and that
their memory would be tested. As an example, participants were
asked to indicate which candidate had used a particular phrase in
the clip a few seconds earlier. The participants were told there
would be similar questions at the end of the debate and they
should pay close attention throughout.
The live coverage was switched on moments after the debate
began, allowing us to ensure our worm was in place as soon as the
screen became visible. Participants remained in their seats for the
duration of the debate, after which the display was turned off and
the answer sheets for the ‘‘after’’ questions were distributed.
Questions were presented one at a time via a Powerpoint
presentation, and were read aloud by a research assistant who
was naive as to the manipulation. Answer sheets were then
collected and participants were handed response sheets for two
final questions which asked if they were suspicious about the
worm. After the responses to these questions were collected the
experimenter provided participants with a verbal debriefing,
explaining that the study was not about memory for political
debates but about the role of social influence processes on
perceptions of the candidates. We informed participants that the
worms were manipulated by us and were not based on the views of
undecided voters.
Questionnaires
Our questionnaires were divided into three parts: Pre-Debate,
Post-Debate and Final (Manipulation Check) questions. Pre-
debate questions began with demographics (age, gender, occupa-
tion, educational qualifications), and then asked participants if they
had previously voted in an election, whether or not they planned
to vote in the upcoming general election, and who was their
current preferred Prime Minister. They were also asked if they had
viewed any of the prior election debates and if so in which format
(live on television, on a website, or a recording), and if they had
previously seen the ‘‘worm’’ graph. Finally, participants were
asked to rate on a 1–7 scale how well they expected each of the
party leaders to perform in the debate.
Post-debate questions began by asking who won the debate
(Putting aside your own party preferences, which party leader do
you think ‘‘won’’ this debate? {Brown, Cameron, Clegg, don’t
know}). Participants were then asked to rate on a 1–5 scale how
well each party leader performed relative to their expectations,
which of the leaders’ policies on the economy appealed to them
the most, and which of the three leaders came across as most
sincere and trustworthy. Participants were also asked how much
the debate would influence their vote on a 1–7 scale and which
candidate was their preferred Prime Minister now they had seen
the debate. They were asked if they had tracked the worm and
who in their opinion had performed best according to the worm,
and the extent to which they agreed with the worm. After the
responses to the post-debate questions had been collected,
participants were asked if they suspected that the worm graph
might not correspond to the views of undecided voters (that is, that
the experimenters may have manipulated the worm). The last
question asked if the worm was biased in favour of any of the party
leaders.
Control sample
The day after the debate, we asked 61 students on the Royal
Holloway campus who had viewed the debate but who had not
taken part in our study to answer a single question. The students
were asked to put aside party preferences and in a secret ballot
state who they thought won the debate.
Results
Our deception was successful: in ratings made following the
debate, the majority of viewers said that they did not suspect the
worm had been manipulated. A minority (13%) said they were
sure that the worm had been manipulated, which may reflect a
perceived implausibility in either the appearance or degree of bias
of our worms, but may also reflect participants’ unfamiliarity with
the worm, their knowledge that they were taking part in a
psychology experiment and the leading nature of the question
(‘‘Did you suspect that the worm graph might not correspond to
the views of undecided voters (that is, that the experimenters may
have manipulated the worm)?’’). We present results from the full
sample of 150 participants, but an identical pattern is obtained
when analysis is restricted to those participants who did not
suspect the worm had been manipulated.
The results supported our hypothesis (see Figure 2). In the
Brown-biased group, 47% of participants reported that Brown had
won the debate (ahead of Clegg on 35% and Cameron on 13%).
By contrast, in the Clegg-biased group 79% of participants
Figure 2. Viewers’ perceptions of which candidate won the
debate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018154.g002
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and Cameron on 4%). Thus, each group selected the winner that
was consistent with the bias of the worm that they viewed. The
effect of the worm’s bias on the judgements of perceived winner
was significant, x
2(3)=34.69, p=.000, R
2=.235 (all R
2 values we
report are Nagelkerke pseudo-R
2 from multinomial logistic
regression analyses; ref. 24). A noteworthy aspect of the data
was the relatively poor performance of Cameron, who was widely
judged in larger polls to have won the debate [25–26]. His poor
performance here is consistent with the fact that the worm was
biased against him in both groups. However, it could also reflect
the characteristics of the present demographic. To test the latter
possibility, we polled an independent random sample of 61 Royal
Holloway students on the day following the debate. The
anonymous responses from this control sample showed a much
more even distribution of perceived winners (Figure 2), reinforcing
the conclusion that the worm had strong positive and negative
influences on judgments of the candidates’ performances.
To test the biasing effect of the worm further we constructed a
regression model that attempted to predict participants’ judge-
ments of the debate winner based on the worm’s actual bias, the
worm’s perceived bias, and participants’ prior preference of prime
minister. We excluded seven participants who responded ‘Don’t
Know’ to the question about who won the debate; in the resulting
data set, there were 71 participants in the Brown-biased group and
72 in the Clegg-biased group. The full model was statistically
significant, x
2(14)=69.01, p=.000, R
2=0.456. The predictive
power of each individual variable in the model was tested using
ratio likelihood tests which computed a chi-square statistic based
on the log likelihood difference between the full model and a
reduced model that excluded that variable. The results of this
analysis are shown in Table 1. As can be seen, the best predictor of
participants’ judgements of the debate winner was their prior
preference of prime minister. For example, of the 48 participants
who preferred Clegg prior to the debate, 75% thought that he had
won the debate, versus 21% who thought Brown had won. By
contrast, of the 25 participants who preferred Brown prior to the
debate, 60% thought that he had won the debate, versus 28% who
thought Clegg had won. It is not surprising that viewers’ opinions
of who won the debate are related to those viewers’ prior
preferences. More importantly, there was a strong, independent
effect of the worm’s bias. Thus, as can be seen in Table 1, the
reduced model which did not include bias (but which did include
the other four predictors) accounted for significantly less variance
in participants’ responses than the full model.
The inclusion of the Perceived Worm Winner factor in the full
model allowed us to examine the extent to which participants’
judgments of who won simply reflected their perception of which
candidate was favoured by the worm. Scores on this factor were
derived from participants’ responses to the post-debate question,
‘‘Based on the movements of the worm, which leader do you think
did best? {Brown, Cameron, Clegg, don’t know}’’. The results,
shown in Table 1, indicate that the exclusion of this factor from
the full model did not significantly affect the amount of variance
that could be explained, i.e., participants’ explicit perceptions of
which candidate was favoured by the worm, did not uniquely
predict their judgments of the debate winner. Thus, our
manipulation of the worm had effects on people’s judgements
that went beyond their own reported perceptions of the worm’s
movements.
We also considered whether the effect of the worm depends on
its agreement with the viewer’s own judgments. If the viewer
perceives the worm to be biased in favour of a specific candidate,
she may be more likely to disregard its evaluation. Indeed, such a
perception could provoke a reinforcement of the viewer’s initial
attitudes [27]. To test whether agreement with the worm
influenced the results, we considered participants’ responses to
the following question: ‘‘To what extent did you agree with the
responses of these undecided voters? (as reflected by the worm)’’,
rated on a scale from 1 to 7. To facilitate analysis, we collapsed
responses into two categories: Low Agreement (1–3 on the original
scale) and High Agreement (5–7 on the original scale). We then
performed regression analyses separately for these two categories.
The Low Agreement condition (N=65) showed the same pattern
of results as the full sample, i.e., significant effects of both the
worm’s bias, x
2(2)=16.36, p=.000, and the viewer’s prior
preference, x
2(6)=24.19, p=.000. The High Agreement condi-
tion (N=43) showed a different pattern: the worm’s bias continued
to be a significant predictor, x
2(2)=20.26, p=.000, but the
viewer’s prior preference was not a significant predictor,
x
2(6)=24.19, p=.619. The latter result is an artefact of the
distribution of participants across the two agreement conditions:
participants assigned to the High Agreement condition frequently
had a prior preference that agreed with the bias of the worm, and
hence there was a range restriction issue that reduced the
predictive power of the prior preference variable. Critically,
though, the bias of the worm significantly affected viewers’
judgments even when they claimed to disagree with its evaluations.
It is interesting to consider whether viewers can minimise the
influence of the worm by not attending to it. We asked our
participants how much they attended to the worm (‘‘Not at all’’,
‘‘A little’’, ‘‘Quite often’’, or ‘‘Attended mostly to the worm’’).
Relatively few participants (13%) reported attending only a little or
not at all to the worm. The worm was extremely salient, often
crossing over the heads of the debaters (as in the display used in
the ITV broadcast that we modelled our display on), and so it is
not surprising that it captured viewers’ attention. It remains an
open question as to whether a similar influence would be obtained
using a more subtle presentation of the worm. However, it is
feasible that such a presentation could have an equally strong, or
stronger influence. Affective judgments can sometimes be
influenced more strongly by subliminal than by supraliminal
stimuli [28], and recent research on voting has shown that subtle
contextual priming can influence real-world voting [29].
The results considered so far show that our manipulation of the
worm influenced viewers’ judgments of who won the debate. But
did the worm also influence viewers’ subsequent choices of
preferred prime minister? Based on responses given immediately
after the debate, the answer is yes. The model that included the
worm’s bias and the viewer’s prior preference as predictors
provided a good account of choices of preferred prime minister,
x
2(12)=109.00, R
2=.569, p=.000, and the worm’s bias was a
significant predictor even after preferred prime minister prior to
the debate was partialled out, x
2(3)=10.19, p=.017. As can be
seen in Figure 3, just over a third of participants were undecided as
Table 1. Likelihood ratio tests of variables in the multinomial
regression model predicting debate winner.
Effect
22 Log Likelihood
of Reduced Model x
2 df p
Bias of worm 88.60 10.20 2 .006
**
Preference before debate 108.37 29.97 6 .000
**
Perceived worm winner 83.72 5.32 6 .503
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018154.t001
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decreased to only 10% following the debate. Most of these
undecided voters were swayed in the direction of the worm,
although there was a general trend for Clegg to become a more
popular choice following the debate. However, the effect of the
worm remained significant when previously undecided voters were
excluded from the analysis, x
2(3)=11.40, p=.010. That is, even
those individuals who specified prior to the debate a clear
preference for which candidate they would like to be prime
minister were vulnerable to having their preference modified by
the manipulated worm.
It was not possible to determine if the influence of the worm on
our participants would persist right through until election day, as
there was an ethical requirement to debrief participants following
the experiment, ensuring they understood our manipulation of the
worm. Prior to debriefing, though, we asked participants, ‘‘How
much will this debate influence your vote?’’ They gave ratings
between 1 and 7, where 1 indicates ‘‘not at all’’ and 7 indicates
‘‘very strongly’’. Over half of the sample responded with a rating
of 5 or more. When the sample was restricted to those who said
that they would vote and had not already submitted a postal vote,
65% gave ratings of 5 or more, and 37% gave ratings of 6 or more.
We conclude that watching the debate had a relatively strong
influence on voting intentions. This conclusion is consistent with
data collected by pollsters following this debate [26], and with
previous research [2–9].
Discussion
Our results show that the presence of a worm graph during a
televised election debate influences viewers’ judgments of who won
the debate, who they would prefer to lead the country, and how
they intend to vote. The existence of such a social influence effect
is consistent with much previous psychological evidence. Never-
theless, it was unclear whether such an effect could occur in the
real-world context of an election debate, given the more explicit
attempts at influence by the candidates in the debate, the
robustness of viewers’ political attitudes and the fact that viewers
have a personal stake in the election outcome. The surprisingly
large effect of our experimental manipulation is therefore of both
scientific interest and social importance.
A particularly insidious aspect of the worm’s influence is that
this influence appears to go beyond the viewer’s explicit memory
for the worm’s movements. That is, the biasing effect of the worm
continued to be a significant predictor of judgements of who won
the debate even after partialling out the contribution of viewers’
perceptions of which candidate was favoured by the worm. This
result suggests that the worm’s influence may be quite difficult for
viewers to discount.
In principle, televised election debates allow voters to form
judgements about the leaders and their policies without the filter of
(often unbalanced) media sources. Some writers have argued that
this absence of ‘‘spin’’ is also a positive aspect of the worm:
I love the crawler and think that it really helps you
understand what’s going on in the debates – in particular, it
helps you take one step back from your own prejudices. It’s
also just about the only input into debate commentary that
comes more or less unmediated; the anonymous ‘‘undecid-
ed’’ focus group participants might be dumb or irrational,
but they’re at least not pushing an agenda. Raw data is
always good to have. [30]
According to this perspective, the worm is simply an additional
source of ‘‘raw data’’. Schill and Kirk [10] agree with this
perspective, arguing that broadcasting the worm is ‘‘fundamentally
empowering’’, in that ‘‘it provides viewers more information to
consider when watching the debates and forming their own
opinions’’. However, we dispute the claim that this is empowering
to the viewer. Rather, our results indicate that the presence of the
worm makes it more difficult for viewers to form opinions that are
truly their own.
Indeed, it is not clear that the worm is a good source of ‘‘raw
data’’. The sample sizes used to produce worm graphs compare
unfavourably with sample sizes in the hundreds or thousands that
are standard in political polls (which are themselves known to be
associated with a considerable degree of error). In the 2010 UK
election debates, ITV’s worm was based on a sample of only 20
undecided voters and the BBC’s worm was based on only 12
undecided voters for each candidate, and as noted above, in the
2008 US Presidential debates CNN used a sample size of 30 voters
[31]. Small sample sizes give rise to the genuine possibility that the
worm will, by chance, be biased in favour of one of the candidates.
Furthermore, there is also the possibility of systematic sources of
bias in the worm. There is generally very little information
provided regarding the manner in which undecided voters were
selected to generate the worm. When participants are not paid for
their time [10], or are paid only a small fee, it is likely that most of
those who take part will live in the close vicinity of the
broadcasting venue, which may not give rise to a representative
sample of the voting population at large. Even with careful
sampling, there may be cause to be uncertain of the representa-
tiveness of voters who report that they are undecided and yet are
sufficiently engaged in the political process to sacrifice their time to
participate in debate broadcasts.
Perhaps most worryingly, the technology could be used to
systematically distort the outcome of elections. In the United
Kingdom, it is not unusual for media organisations to have a
specific political alignment; for example, each of the major daily
newspapers advised their readers of which of the leaders in the
Figure 3. Preferred choice of prime minister for individuals in
the two groups, before and after the debate.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018154.g003
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biggest selling newspaper, The Sun (owned by Rupert Murdoch)
took credit for having swung the outcome of the closely fought
1992 election [32]. It would seem prudent to avoid a situation in
which a media organisation could be accused of having (even
inadvertently) manipulated viewers’ real-time opinions of televised
election debates.
In sum, our data indicate that viewers exposed to the worm are
subject to social influence processes which later form the basis of
their opinions. Thus, the responses of a small group of individuals
could, via the worm, influence millions of voters. This possibility is
not conducive to a healthy democracy, and therefore we argue
that broadcasters should avoid the simultaneous presentation of
average response data with televised election debates.
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